

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS: THEORY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

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In the Third week of October, 1962, the Soviet Union was clandestinely constructing offensive strategic missiles in Cuba. Why?

In December, 1970, approximately 300,000 U.S. troops were stationed in Germany. The Nixon Administration was publicly committed not to withdraw any of these troops before July, 1971. How many U.S. troops will be in Germany by the end of 1972?

If in 1964 a Secretary of Defense had strongly opposed deployment of ABM, how might he have gone about preventing deployment? []

The first question asks for an explanation; the second for a prediction; the third for a plan. These are three central activities in which both analysts of international politics and makers of foreign policy engage. In response to the first question, most analysts begin by considering various objectives that the Soviets might have had in mind, for example, to probe American intentions, to defend Cuba, or to improve their bargaining position. By examining the problems that the Soviets faced and the character of the action they chose (for example, the simultaneous installation of MRBMs and IRBMs) they eliminate some of these aims as implausible. Explanation then consists in

These considerations can be combined, in some intuitive fashion, to yield a prediction.

constructing a calculation that permits us to understand how, in the particular situation, with certain objectives, one could have chosen to place missiles in Cuba. In attempting to predict whether the U.S. will withdraw troops from Europe, and if so, how many, most analysts would consider (1) U.S. national security interests in Europe, (2) the contribution of U.S. troops to the defense of Europe, (3) the effect of U.S. withdrawals on European willingness to maintain adequate defenses and (4) the possible use of U.S. forces as a bargaining counter in persuading the Soviet Union to reduce forces in Europe. In recommending plans for opposing deployment, many analysts would have focused on "understanding the problem," defining U.S. national security interests, developing an unambiguous strategic doctrine that permitted determination of the U.S. interests in a particular issue. If in this manner the Secretary of Defense could demonstrate the disutility of ABM, he would maximize his chances of preventing deployment.

Characteristic of each of these three answers is a basic approach: a fundamental set of assumptions and categories for thinking about foreign affairs. This approach depends primarily on the assumption that events in international politics are the more or less purposive acts of unified national governments; that governmental behavior can be understood by analogy with the intelligent coordinative acts of individual human beings. According to this approach, analysts examine the interests and goals of a nation, the alternative courses of action available, and the costs and benefits of each alternative. An event has been explained when the analyst has shown, for example, how the blockade was a reasonable choice, given the U.S. strategic objectives. Predictions are generated by calculating the rational thing to

Recommended plays do in a certain situation, given specified objectives. Concentrate on developing doctrine and defining interests. Let the reader consider how he would go about explaining, for

example, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 or North Vietnamese activity in Laos and Cambodia. One typically puts himself in the place of the nation or the national government confronted with a problem of foreign affairs and tries to figure out how he might have chosen the action in question. If I had been the Soviet Union faced with the threat of Czech liberalization, or the Czech threat to the economy of the Bloc, ... Moreover, this is not simply the way we react to current events; it is the way most analysts, most of the time, structure their most careful explanations and predictions of important occurrences in foreign affairs. [1]

Few readers will find the simple assertion of this point persuasive.

Obviously there are several variants of this basic approach. Obviously the approach does not capture all of the analysis of those who employ it.

Obviously not all analysts rely on this approach all of the time. But as one of us has argued at much greater length elsewhere, this framework -- Model I

~~The "unitary actor model" (Model I)~~ -- has been the dominant approach to the study of international politics. (Even analysts concerned primarily with discovering causal relations between certain variables [environmental or intra-national] and specific outcomes, when called upon to explain or predict, display a tendency to rely on assumption of purposive unitary nations coping within the constraints established by their relations.)

This basic approach has much to recommend it. This "lens" reduces the organizational and political complications of government to the simplification of a single actor. The array of details about a happening can be seen to cluster around the major

features of an action. Through this lens, the confused and even contradictory factors that influence an occurrence become a single dynamic: choice of the alternative that achieved a certain goal. This approach permits a quick, imaginative sorting out of a problem of explanation or prediction. It serves as a productive shorthand, requiring a minimum of information. It can yield an informative summary of tendencies, for example, by identifying the weight of strategic costs and benefits. But this simplification -- like all simplifications -- obscures as well as reveals. In particular, it obscures the persistently neglected fact of bureaucracy: the "maker" of government policy is not one calculating decisionmaker but rather a conglomerate of large organizations and political actors who differ substantially about what their government should do on any particular issue, and who compete in attempting to affect both governmental decisions and the behavior of their government.

The purpose of this paper is to present an alternative approach that focuses on intra-national factors, in particular Bureaucratic Politics, in explaining national behavior in inter-national relations. The argument is that these factors are very important, underemphasized, and critical when one is concerned with ^{planning} policy.

Section I of this paper presents the alternative approach: a Bureaucratic Politics Model. Our hope is that the framework is sufficiently general to apply to the behavior of ^{most} any modern government, though our primary base is the U.S. government. Section II suggests how this approach can be applied to understand how one nation influences the behavior of another. Section III states a number of policy implications of this alternative approach.

Section I:

A BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS MODEL

~~For more purposeful decisionmaking by the president has been summarized as action chosen by a unitary, purposeful decisionmaker centrally controlled, completely informed, and value maximizing. But even causal empiricism suggests that in fact governments consist of large numbers of individuals who differ considerably about what the government ought to do on any particular issue, and who compete for influence to affect governmental decisions and the implementation of those decisions.~~ Our purpose here is to outline a rough-cut framework for focusing primarily on the central actors within a government and interaction among them as determinants of the behavior of a government in international politics. The bargaining along regularized circuits among players positioned hierarchically within the government is importantly affected by a number of constraints, in particular, organizational processes, and shared values. Nevertheless, what the government does in any particular instance can be understood according to this model largely as a result that emerges from these bargaining games. In contrast with ~~the~~ Model, this Bureaucratic Politics Model sees no unitary actor but rather many actors as players; who focus not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse intra-national problems as well; in terms of no consistent set of strategic objectives but rather according to various ^{Security} conceptions of national, organizational, domestic, and personal interests; making governmental decisions not by rational choice but ~~rational~~ pulling and hauling ~~and~~.

The concept of national security policy as "political" outcome contradicts both public imagery and academic orthodoxy. Issues vital to national security

are too important to be settled by political games. They must be "above" politics: to accuse someone of "playing politics with national security" is a most serious charge. Thus, memoirs typically handle the details of such bargaining with a velvet glove. For example, both Sorensen and Schlesinger present the efforts of the Executive Committee in the Cuban missile crisis as rational deliberation among a unified group of equals. What public conviction demands, the academic penchant for intellectual elegance reinforces. Internal politics is messy; moreover, according to prevailing doctrine, politicking lacks intellectual content. It therefore constitutes gossip for journalists rather than a subject for serious investigation. Occasional memoirs, anecdotes in historical accounts, and several detailed case studies to the contrary, most of the foreign policy literature avoids bureaucratic politics.

The gap between academic literature and the experience of participants in government is nowhere wider than at this point. For those who participate in government the terms of daily employment cannot be ignored: government leaders have competitive, not homogeneous interests; priorities and perceptions are shaped by positions; problems are much more varied than straightforward strategic issues; management of piecemeal streams of decisions is more critical than steady state choices; making sure that the government does what is decided is more difficult than selecting the preferred solution.

This general characterization can be sharpened by articulating the Bureaucratic Politics Model as an "analytic paradigm" in the technical sense developed by Robert K. Merton for sociological analysis. Systematic statement of basic assumptions, concepts, and suggestive propositions may highlight the distinctive thrust of this style of analysis. (Wherever possible, we attempt to use terms the way they are normally used.) But the concepts that constitute this paradigm are often given a more specific definition for purposes of

clarity.)

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS PARADIGM

I. Basic Unit of Analysis.

In thinking about problems of foreign affairs, what most analysts are really interested in are outcomes -- that is, basic characteristics of the real world as they are affected by the behavior of governments. Thus, for example, the problem of proliferation is really how many nations have what nuclear capabilities at some point in the future. An explanation of the Cuban missile crisis must allow one to understand that at some point, Soviet missiles were no longer in Cuba, the U.S. was publicly committed not to invade Cuba, and all this had been accomplished without nuclear war. When explaining, predicting, or planning, an analyst (at least implicitly) specifies some characteristics of the real world that focus ^{his} attention.

(Formally, this can be represented as a set of variables and their values.)

It is an assumption of the approach developed here that in order to explain, predict, or plan outcomes, it is necessary to break the outcome down into the behavior of particular governments, to treat these behaviors and the effect of one nation's behavior on the other, and in this way to treat the whole event. Thus the basic unit of analysis here is the behavior of a government, that is, the sum of all behavior of all officials of the government in the exercise of public authority that affect the world external

to that governmental machine relevant to a specified issue. To analyze this behavior, one needs to examine both decision games and behavior games.

Decision games yield results in the form of policy decisions (official aspirations about a range of outcomes) and action decisions (official designation that the government behave in a specified manner). Behavior games yield results in the form of various behavior by elements of the government.

Thus, for example, in the Skybolt episode, the fact that in January, 1963, the U.S. was not longer developing Skybolt, an Executive Agreement committed the U.S. to sell Polaris to the U.K., and certain members of both governments were still smarting over having been treated badly, constitutes an outcome. This outcome was affected by the policy decision in the United States to oppose nuclear proliferation as well as the action decision of the British government to build nuclear powered submarines which could carry Polaris missiles. A behavior game in the U.S. resulted in the termination of contracts to procure Skybolt missiles; a behavior game in the U.K. resulted in Prime Minister MacMillan's request to President Kennedy for Polaris missiles.[5]

II. Organizing Concepts.

The various organizing concepts can be arranged as elements in the answers to 3 central questions: (1) Who plays? (2) What determines each player's stand? (3) How are players' stands and moves aggregated to yield results?

A. Who plays? That is, whose preferences and actions have an important effect on the government's actual behavior?

In any government, there exists a circle of ^{selected} central players in the national security policy game. This circle includes the major political figures, ^{the heads of} the major national security organizations including intelligence, the military, and for some purposes, the organization that manages budgetary allocations and the economy. Generally one of these players is the head of government who may have a disproportionate share of influence on major decisions. Other individuals can enter this central circle, either on a more regular or a strictly ad hoc basis, because of their relation with the head of the government. Organizations, and groups, can usefully be treated as players when (1) summarizing the official papers that emerge from an organization as coherent calculated

moves of a unitary actor; (2) treating the actions of the head of an organization, whose goals are determined largely by that organization, as actions of the organization; and (3) summarizing the various behaviors of different individual members of an organization as coherent strategies and tactics in a single plan.)

Around the central circle of senior players, there are various further circles of junior players. The mix of senior and junior players differs from one type of issue to the next. Actors in the wider governmental game, (especially "Congressional influentials") members of the press, spokesmen for important interest groups (especially the "bipartisan foreign policy establishment" in and out of Congress), and surrogates for each of these groups, can enter the game in a more or less regularized fashion. Other members of the Congress, press, interest groups, and public form concentric circles around the central arena -- circles that demarcate limits within

The mix of players will vary depending on the issue and the type of game. Senior players will dominate in decision games, but in ~~negotiations~~ ^{behavior} games on the same issue quite junior players in the organization charged with carrying out the decision may play a major role.

B. What determines each player's stand? What determines his perceptions and interests that lead to a stand?

Answers to the question "What is the issue?" or "What must be done?" are colored by the position from which the question is considered. A player is an individual in a position. His perceptions and preferences stem from his individual characteristics (for example, attitudes

shared with other members of the society and government as well as attitudes special to himself) and from his position.

The interests and objectives that affect players' desired results can be characterized under four headings: national security interests, organizational interests, domestic interests, and personal interests. Some elements of national security interests are widely accepted, for example, the interest in the U.S. ~~being~~ ^{existing} ~~remaining~~, ^{existing} ~~survival~~, and the belief that if the U.S. were to unilaterally disarm, other nations would use military force against the U.S. and its allies with very serious adverse consequences. But in most cases, reasonable men can disagree about how U.S. national security interests will be affected by a specific issue. Thus other interests can affect an individual's perception of, and arguments about, the national security interest. Members of an organization, particularly career officials, come to believe that the health of their organization is vital to the national interest. The health of the organization is in turn seen to depend on such interests as autonomy, roles and missions, size of budget, morale, and the successful execution of the mission to pursue what is seen as the essence of the organization's activities of the organization. Autonomy is generally accorded the highest priority.

While many bureaucrats are unconcerned with domestic affairs and politics and do not ask themselves how a proposed change in policy or behavior would affect domestic political issues, the President and senior players will almost always be concerned about domestic implications. Finally, a proposal to withdraw American troops from Europe, for example, is to the Army a threat to its budget and size; to the Budget Bureau a way to save money; to Treasury a balance of payments gain; to the State Department Bureau of European Affairs a threat to good relations with NATO; to the President's Congressional adviser an opportunity to remove a major irritant in the President's relations with the Hill. resolution of this issue may affect his interests. This defines his stakes

in the issue at hand. In the light of these stakes, he then determines his stand on the issue.

Suggestive propositions.

1. There are important differences between (1) governmental systems in which many of the players in the central game hold their positions because of political influence and are aspirants for the position of the head of the government and (2) governmental systems in which most central players have no thought of ascending to the major position. In the former, players' personal interest in remaining in the game, and advancing towards the top, frequently dominate in determining their stand on issues. ~~For example,~~
2. Beyond the central circle, players are often motivated by the desire to participate and are likely to take stands that permit them to get into the game.
3. Organizational interests are often dominated by the desire to maintain health and the autonomy of the organization in pursuing what its members view as the essence of the organization's activity, e.g., flying for the Air Force.
4. Even, and perhaps particularly, in crises, organizations compete for rôles and missions. *particularly of career officials*
5. Perceptions of national security interests are shaped by perceptions that are heavily influenced by organizational interests.
6. Organizational interests weigh more heavily in the full set of *senior* interests of some players than in others. In the U.S. government, there seems to be a rough spectrum from, for example, the Chief of Naval Operations to the Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of State, to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

- C. How are players' stands and moves aggregated to yield results and thus the behavior of a government on any issue?

The behavior of a government on any issue results from both decision games and behavior games. The results of a decision game typically trigger a behavior game about the implementation of that decision, and it is therefore often convenient to examine these results as if they occur in sequence. But it is important to recognize that behavior games can proceed without any formal police or action decision having been reached, and furthermore, that behavior and decision games about a single issue sometimes occur simultaneously.

1. Decision games.

Sometimes an issue arises because some member of the government sees something that he wants to change, and moves. Most often, however, the game is begun by a necessity that something be done, either in response to a deadline (e.g., the annual budget), or an event (external or domestic).

When he becomes aware that a game has begun, each player must determine his stand and then decide whether to play (if he has a choice) and if so, how hard. These decisions require a calculation (often implicit) about both resources and reputation. Resources are finite, and fungible; e.g., time, or each senior player's account with the President. Reputation depends on one's track record, thus players consider the probability of success as well as the importance of their interest.

Games do not proceed randomly, but rather according to established rules. Action channels, i.e., regularized ways of reaching decisions on issues of a certain type, structure the game by pre-selecting the major players, determining their usual points of entrance into the game, and distributing particular advantages for each game. Typically, issues are recognized and determined within an established channel for producing action. In almost every case, however, there are several possible channels by which the issue could be resolved. Each channel has regularized procedures that assign the "action" to one player and the right to be consulted to others. Players manoeuvre to get the issue into the channel which they believe is most likely to yield the desired result.

Each player's probability of success depends upon his power. Power (effective influence on outcomes) is an elusive blend of at least three elements: bargaining advantages, skill and will in using bargaining advantages, ~~information~~ and other players' perceptions of the first two ingredients. Bargaining advantages stem from control of implementation, control over information which enables one to define the problem and identify the available options, persuasiveness with other players, including players outside the bureaucracy, and the ability to affect other players' objectives in other games, including domestic political games. The power of particular players is importantly affected by constraints, in particular the routines of organizations in supplying information and options, and shared values within the society and bureaucracy.

The game consists of each player using his power in various manoeuvres to achieve his desired results. Some players develop sophisticated plans, though most players seem to plan very little. Some players have the power to move an issue from one channel to another. All players can try to change other players' stands by arguments.

The resolution of an issue can be a policy decision, an action decision, or the avoidance of a decision.

Decisions may

A be very general or quite specific. Decisions may involve a designation

of a responsible individual or organization to implement the decision.

Decisions of several different games will affect a single ~~game~~. For

example, the policy decision to oppose proliferation and the action

decision to sell Polaris missiles to Great Britain both affected the

behavior of American officials in their negotiations with the officials

of the British Government in implementing the Nassau agreement on

Polaris. Even when an action decision is very specific, behavior does

not follow directly. Results of action games heavily influence behav-

ior, but other factors enter as well. Hence, we need to consider

Behavior

2. Implementing Games

Behavior

~~Implementing~~ games do not proceed at random. Action channels

structure these games, as they do decision games, by pre-selecting the

major actors and determining which organizations can carry out partic-

ular actions. However, in many cases the rules permit a choice of

implementors. Negotiations with foreign governments are usually the

concern of the foreign office but can be assigned to a special envoy

of the head of government or to the intelligence services. Military

training functions can be assigned to an aid organization or the intel-

ligence services rather than to the military. In other cases there

may be choices within the military, e.g., a bombing mission to the U.S.

Air Force or Navy. Specific monitoring functions may be assigned to

an organization with an interest in the behavior but no capability to

carry it out.

The behavior of an organization at any given time will involve

primarily a continuation of past behavior. A change in behavior may

result from a process internal to the organization without any high

level decision. In such cases the motive may be to deal with an internal organizational problem. More often the purpose will be to influence an ongoing decision game, often one not obviously connected with the behavior. For example,

Policy, and particularly action, decisions will pose a specific choice for organizations: should they carry out the action which is directed by the decision? Players in other organizations who desire to see the decision implemented will seek to compel compliance by threatening to call the non-compliance to the attention of senior players, with a resultant censure of the organization or transfer of the mission. In some cases players will feel obligated to comply.

Neustadt's description of when Cabinet officers in the United States feel that they must do what the President wants them to do is suggestive.

In writing about President Harry Truman's dismissal of General MacArthur, Truman's seizure of the steel mill and President Dwight Eisenhower's dispatch of troops to Little Rock, he concludes:

[T]his brief recital is enough to show what lay behind the ready execution of these orders. At least five common factors were at work. On each occasion the President's involvement was unambiguous. So were his words. His order was widely publicized. The men who received it had control of everything needed to carry it out. And they had no apparent doubt of his authority to issue it to them. It is no accident that these five factors can be found in all three instances. These are the factors that produce self-executing orders. Lacking any one of them the chances are that mere command will not produce compliance.] [6]

Even when organizations and players seek to implement faithfully the policy and action decisions of their government, there is often a large gap between the behavior envisioned by senior players and what in fact is done. This results largely from the constraints of large organizations (see below pp.). Often implementors feel free to vary their behavior from the spirit if not the letter of decisions. In that case the gap is wider. We return to these questions in Part II.

III. Constraints

Obviously, the factors highlighted in this model assume a ceteris paribus clause. Other features, treated here as constraints, bias the outcomes of the bureaucratic politics game. Obviously, for some classes of governmental behavior, e.g., the detail characteristics of the behavior of large organizations, these other factors may be more important than those emphasized by ~~the~~ ^{The Bureaucratic Politics} model. Indeed, what is described here as an "organizational constraint" has been elaborated elsewhere by one of us as an alternative model. The issue of typology, that is, what factors weigh most heavily for what classes of outcomes, is a central issue for further research.

A. Organizational constraints.

The game among players (and organizations considered as players) proceeds within a context. A large part of that context is the existing configuration of large organizations and their established programs and standard operating procedures (SOPs) for performing various functions. These organizational routines are especially important in determining (1) the information available to the central players, (2) the options that the senior players consider, and (3) the actual details of whatever is done by the government.

How does information about most national problems become available to members of a government? For example, how did the U.S. government become aware of the Soviet construction of missiles in Cuba in 1962? For the most part, information is collected and processed by large organizations. In the Cuban missile crisis, only the existence of organizations like the CIA and Air Force, with existing capabilities and processes, yielded a U-2 flight over Cuba according to a pattern that discovered the missiles in the second week of October.

F

This characterization captures the thrust of the bureaucratic politics orientation. If problems of foreign policy arose as discrete issue, and decisions were determined one game at a time, this account would suffice. But most "issues," e.g., Vietnam or the proliferation of nuclear weapons, emerge piecemeal over time, one lump in one context, a second in another. Hundreds of issues compete for players' attention every day. Each player is forced to fix upon his issues for that day, deal with them on their own terms, and rush on to the next. Thus the character of emerging issue and the pace at which the game is played converge to yield government "decisions" and "actions" as collages. Choices by one player (e.g., to authorize action by his department, to make a speech, or to refrain from acquiring certain information),

decisions and "foul-ups" (e.g., points that are not decided because they are not recognized or are raised too late, misunderstandings, etc.) -- these pieces, when stuck to the same canvas, constitute government behavior relevant to an issue. To explain why one particular formal governmental decision was made, or why one pattern of governmental behavior emerged, it is necessary to identify the games and players, to display the coalitions, bargains, and compromises, and to convey some feel for the confusion.

Suggestive Propositions

1. Behavior of a government seldom reflects a single consistent set of calculations about national security interests.

The menu of alternatives defined by organizations in sufficient detail to be live options is severely limited in both number and character.

The short list of alternatives -- if indeed more than one is presented -- reflects not only the costs of alternative

generations, but more important, each organization's interest in controlling -- rather than presenting -- choices (for example, by serving up one real alternative framed by two extremes). The character of the alternatives, i.e., the location of the set of alternatives in the universe of possible alternatives relevant to the leader's objectives, differs significantly from the character of alternatives that would be presented by a team of five disinterested experts. The difference is a function of the configuration of established organizations and their existing goals and procedures. Alternatives that are built into existing organizational goals, e.g., both incremental improvements in each military service's primary weapons system and major new developments in that line, will be adequate (i.e., compare favorably with the experts' list, though with less sensitivity to cost).

Alternatives that require coordination of several organizations, e.g., multi-service/weapons systems, are likely to be poor. Alternatives in areas between organizations, e.g., weapons that are not represented by a major service component, are likely to be poor.

Behavior according to SOPs and programs does not constitute far-sighted, flexible adaptation to "the issue" (as it is conceived by the analyst). Detail and nuance of actions by organizations are determined chiefly by organizational routines. SOPs constitute routines for dealing with standard situations. Routines allow large numbers of ordinary individuals to deal with numerous instances, day after day, without much thought. But this regularized capacity for adequate performance is purchased at the price of standardization. Specific instances, particularly critical instances that typically do not have

"standard" characteristics, are often handled sluggishly or inappropriately. A program, i.e., a complex cluster of SOPs, is rarely tailored to the specific situation in which it is executed. Rather, the program is (at best) the most appropriate of programs in the existing repertoire. Since repertoires are developed by parochial organizations for standard scenarios that the organization has defined, programs available for dealing with a particular situation are often ill-suited to it.

B. Shared attitudes and images.

Perceptions of issues, arguments about the national interest, etc., do not begin ab initio. At any given time there is a set of values and images of the world that are taken for granted by most of those in the bureaucracy. A constant value is the need to take actions necessary for nation ^{and images} the survival of the ~~United States~~. Other values will change over time.

They will provide answers to such questions as who are the actual or potential enemies of the United States and what their intentions, capability, and determination are; who are our friends and what their capability and intentions are. These images also provide answers to questions such as what influences the behavior of other nations. While one can make a sharp analytic distinction between sentences which describe how the ^{world} works and sentences that describe what ~~the United States~~ wishes to accomplish, in practice, the shared set of images will ^{blur} the two and produce a set of beliefs such as the following ~~for the United States~~:

- o The United States should act to halt the spread of Communism.
- o Only force will deter the Chinese from aggression.
- o The loss of U.S. gold to foreign central banks is threat to U.S. prosperity and should be avoided.

- o A capability for assured destruction is necessary to deter the Soviet Union.
 - o European unification is desirable.
 - o Good relations with Japan are important to U.S. security interests.
- o Most participants will accept these images. Their conclusion of what is in the national interest will be shaped by these images and the arguments which they put forward will be based on these images. Most participants will tend to reinterpret actions by other nations to make them consistent with their images, rather than re-examining their basic views. Even those in the bureaucracy who do not share some or all of these values and images will be forced to act and to argue as if they believed them. They will do this because to do otherwise will be to be suspect by others within the bureaucracy. ~~Bureaucrats will shape their arguments in a particular policy battle to fit into the perceptions set up by external objectives, even if they do not accept them.~~

c. Players' perceptions of values and images shared by the society.

Players in the game perceive certain widely shared attitudes and images in the society; often, these are thought of as moods. These perceptions affect the behavior of players and thus the result. For example, the changing public attitude on the legitimate grounds for U.S. intervention in the world.

In 1946, in reacting to the British decision to withdraw its support from Greece and Turkey, the Truman Administration decided that the United States should move into this vacuum. The debate within the Administration focused primarily on the importance of stability in the world and the need to support ~~reputable~~ ^{existing} governments against chaos and ~~local~~ ^{internal} insurgency. The

notion that the United States should intervene in this case because Communists were supporting the dissident elements was apparently only a minor argument within the government. However, the anti-communist element was given prominence in Truman's public defense of this decision because of the belief that public attitudes were such that only an anti-Communist appeal would lead to the necessary Congressional and public support for [77] the new policy.

Over the next two decades the notion that the United States should intervene when states were threatened by communist subversion came to be an accepted part of the image of reality, and shaped a number of U.S. decisions. In the bureaucracy as well as beyond

When President Kennedy, in his inaugural address in 1961, vowed that wherever "the flame of freedom flickered" the U.S. would be there to help, his statement was widely supported and taken to mean that when there were communist threats, the United States would have to intervene. This view dominated the U.S. reaction to a change of government in the Dominican Republic.

By 1969, bureaucrats in the United States appeared to sense a different mood according to

which the U.S. role was seen as supporting countries threatened by insurgency, but with no obligation to do the job for them and with the perception that communist takeovers were not in all instances highly damaging to U.S. interests. The arguments that the United States should intervene in a particular situation could no longer rest on the simple notion that the country in power is being threatened by Communism, and challenges to proposed intervention can be based on a broader range of arguments that alledging the Communists are not involved or that the risks of world war are too great.

D. Reality.

As in the "rational-actor-model" the problem, its alternatives, and their consequences, even if not perceived, obviously affect the outcome. The Soviet-Sino relationship is perhaps the most unique example during the post-war period of the dichotomy that can develop between perceptions of reality and reality. For most of the period from 1949 through the early 1960's, American officials assumed that there was close and continuing cooperation ^{between China} and the Soviet Union. They took it for granted that the Soviet Union would support China if the United States and China came into military conflict, even in cases in which the Chinese appeared to have instigated the military operations. This was true, for example, during the 1958 Quemoy crisis, when American officials assumed that the Soviet Union would back China up if the United States were to launch a military attack against the Chinese mainland during the Chinese Communist invasion [?] of Quemoy.

The consensus within the American bureaucracy as of the late 1960's was that the Soviets no longer could be considered certain to support the Chinese in a crisis, ~~and so it might be dependent upon the change~~

~~peculiar~~ Most observers of the Soviet Union and China would concur that the Soviet Union would have been very unlikely -- as opposed to being certain -- to support China in the event of a Sino-American conflict. In fact, more likely Soviet behavior was to move and seize a piece of Chinese Asian territory along the Sino-Soviet border. The change in American perception occurred largely because of the growing Sino-Soviet ideological split.

Section II;

INTERACTION BETWEEN NATIONS

Most approaches to international politics seem to assume an "interaction model" in which the behavior of each nation is both a response to and a desire to influence the other nations behavior. Nation A on the basis of a calculation of its national security interests and those of Nation B acts to influence Nation B's behavior. Nation B observes the behavior of A and responds.

The bureaucratic model approach suggests an alternative approach to this question. If, in fact, the behavior of individual nations is to be explained according to the paradigm presented above, then the interaction between nations, that is, the question of how one nation's behavior affects the behavior of another, must be seen in a different light. Our discussion of this issue should

(1) illustrate the approach presented in Section I; (2) illuminate its implications for one of the central questions in the study of international politics; and (3) elaborate what may appear to have been left out of the first part of our discussion: the fact ~~is~~ that the behavior of one nation does affect the behavior of others.

We first discuss the way signals get generated, that is, the process by which participants of one nation behave in ways which appear to be ~~designed~~ designed to convince participants in a second nation to alter their behavior. We then examine the way these "signals" are read in the

Prop. 1. The actions of nation A which appear to be designed to influence the actions of nation B may in fact

1. Be a routine continuing pattern of behavior carried out by an organization according to standard procedures and not designed to influence nation B. It may be suddenly noticed, for example, in a crisis to which it seems to be related.

For example, the American U-2 shot down by the Soviet Union just prior to a Summit Conference in 1960 was such an action.

2. Be a maneuver designed to influence a decision game and

- is incidentally visible to other nations' participants.

For example, press leaks on Soviet submarine activity released to the press just before congressional action on the Navy budget have this motive.

- to be effective must appear to be a signal.

For example, following the shooting down of the U-2, in order to protect his influence in the Kremlin, Khrushchev needed to be seen demanding an apology from Eisenhower.

3. Follow from a decision game not related to influencing the behavior of another nation.

For example, budget cuts may lead to changes in overseas troop deployments.

4. Follow from a decision game related to influencing the actions of nation B.

Prop. 2. Some participants in nation B (Foreign Office and Intelligence) are charged with observing, reporting, and explaining the actions of other nations. These participants are likely to put forward explanations

which an outside analyst who accepts BP Model will view as unsatisfactory and to do a poor job of predicting future behavior.

2-1. They will use Model I and hence will assume that the actions were: (1) designed and executed, in effect, by a single individual; (2) designed to influence their nation and was designed carefully, taking into account what really motivates their nation; (3) designed with the same world view as they hold; and (4) designed without regard to the domestic and bureaucratic politics of nation A.

For example, estimates of future Soviet forces structures by the American intelligence community, in general use a Model I framework and are frequently in error.

2-2. They will share the perception problems of all individuals. This means, for example, that

- a. They will give an event a meaning which requires the least reorganization of other ideas
- b. Reports which would lead to a change in plans are distorted in a direction that avoids the necessity of changes in plans
- c. When faced with unacceptable alternatives they will define the situation in a way that will result in their proposing an unrealistic course of action.

For example, evidence of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was ignored. As a second example, one senior military officer urged that the United States proceed to invade Cuba even after the Soviets agreed to remove their missiles.

2-3. They will have difficulty distinguishing "signals" from "noise."

For example, signs of an impending Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor were difficult to distinguish from the surrounding noise. A second example is when Khrushchev warned Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis of the difficulty he had had in convincing his associates that an American U-2 which crossed into Soviet territory was "noise" and not a "signal."

2-4. They will lack data and understanding of nuances of what determines the actions of nation A.

For example, senior players in the British and American governments during the Suez crisis of 1956 and the Skybolt crisis of 1961, while employing an implicit bureaucratic politics model frequently misread the meaning of actions because they lacked an understanding of the nuances of how the other system worked.

Prop. 3. What they report will be further distorted by the SOPs and interests of their organization.

3-1. SOPs will lead to delays and selection different from what senior players would choose.

For example, the procedures of the intelligence community led to a considerable delay from the time evidence of Soviet missiles in Cuba entered the system and when they were reported to senior players.

3-2. SOPs may lead to disguising disagreements and withholding bad news (e.g., Cuba).

3-3. Information will be presented so as to make an action recommendation.

For example, President Eisenhower was told during the Chinese attack on the Offshore Island of Quemoy in 1958 that the fall of Quemoy would have consequences more "far-reaching and catastrophic than those which followed" the fall of China, clearly signalling the action favored.

3-4. Information gathering and reporting procedures will be designed to protect the organizational interests of intelligence agencies, for example, the roles and missions of the agency in relation to other organizations.

For example, there was a one-week delay from the time that U-2 flights over Cuba were ordered and when the first U-2 flew while the CIA and the Air Force fought for operational control of the flights.

3-5. Procedures will also be designed to protect the organizational interests of a parent operating organization.

For example, DIA estimates concerning Vietnam were written so as not to undercut the action recommendations of MACV and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Prop. 4. Senior players will seldom pay much attention to reports of actions of other nations, will be affected by perception problems (2-2), and will report actions and interpret it to support positions they have previously taken.

For example, when the North Koreans invaded South Korea in 1950 State and Defense were split on the desirability of an early peace settlement with Japan. Defense, which favored a delay because bases in Japan were needed, argued that the Korean War demonstrated the need for bases and hence strengthened the case for delay. State argued that

Japanese concern because of the attack would make it possible to negotiate base rights after a Peace Treaty and hence the United States should move quickly to sign a Peace Treaty.

Prop 5: Ability of senior players to pursue their interests may be affected by the actions of nation A in that they may need certain behavior by nation A to pursue their interests at home.

Prop. 6. Thus actions of nation A as reported by the foreign office, intelligence and other senior players may affect the ability of a senior player to pursue his interests by

1. Affecting who is in power.

For example, President Lyndon Johnson may have believed that Soviet deployment of an ABM would hurt his chances of re-election in 1968. Another example, according to Robert Kennedy, both he and President John F. Kennedy believed that the President would be impeached if he did not take military action to get Soviet missiles removed from Cuba.

2. Affecting his power or that of other participants, making it harder for him to get done what he wants or to resist the proposals of other participants.

For example, Kennedy's failure to get Soviet missiles removed from Cuba would certainly have reduced his influence on the American government even if it did not lead to his impeachment. Another example, President Johnson is reported to have believed that getting his Great Society legislation through Congress required that he not permit South Vietnam to fall to communism.

3. Affecting the national security interests of his nation as he

perceives them.

For example, the North Korean invasion of South Korea changed President Harry S. Truman's view of whether it was important to American security to keep South Korea non-communist.

Prop. 7. If actions of nation A affect the ability of a participant to pursue his interests he may change his stand in one or more games or initiate a new game to seize an opportunity or head off a threat.

Prop. 8. His move may be designed to protect or advance his interests without the necessity of affecting the actions of nation A.

For example, President Johnson's decision to deploy an ABM was designed to cancel the possible effect of the Soviet ABM on the 1968 election. By preventing an "ABM gap" issue it accomplished its purpose without need to cause a particular Soviet reaction.

Prop. 9. Alternatively his move may be designed to lead to actions by his nation which he believes will lead nation A to

1. Rescind the threatening actions

For example, President Kennedy and his advisers decided to impose a blockade on Cuba as a means of persuading the Soviet government to remove its missiles from Cuba.

2. Refrain from other actions which are now feared

For example, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev wrote a letter to President Kennedy offering to remove Soviet missiles from Cuba in an effort to prevent a threatened American invasion of Cuba.

3. Take additional steps which will neutralize the threatening actions

For example, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara suggested

that the United States propose to the Soviets the holding of the SALT talks in the hope that their acceptance would neutralize the domestic political threat created by the Soviet ABM deployment without the necessity of a U.S. ABM deployment.

4. Continue beneficial action

For example, American AID officials, encouraged by decisions of the Taiwan government to devote resources to economic development and reduce the size of its army, proposed to continue American economic and military aid to Taiwan in order to continue these developments.

5. Take additional beneficial steps which now appear possible.

For example, President Kennedy was urged by his advisers to deliver the American University speech urging detente with the Soviets because of their hope that the Soviets could be induced to take actions which would be of value in accomplishing their objectives.

Prop. 10. Changes in stands of one or more participants or the initiation of new games may affect the actions of nation B, but the change in behavior is unlikely to be optimized to secure the actions by nation A which is desired by any single participant.

Prop. 11. The generator of a proposal for action designed to affect the behavior of nation A will not put forward an optimum signal.

11-1. Even if his only interest is to design a signal to affect the actions of nation A he is likely to do a poor job.

11-1 a. He is likely to employ a particular model I framework which assumes that nation A:

1. Will be heavily influenced by the behavior of his nation;

2. Is listening closely and with sophistication and will understand the meaning of complex signals;
3. Is unaffected by domestic political constraints (senior players will generally not hold to this point);
4. Shares the images of the world which his nation accepts.

For example, a dying Secretary of State John F. Dulles, giving his last advice to then Vice President Richard Nixon on how to communicate with Soviet leaders, assured him that "Khrushchev does not need to be convinced of our good intentions. He knows we are not aggressors and do not threaten the security of the Soviet Union. He understands us."

11-1 b. Even if not, he is likely to lack data and an understanding of nuances of how the process works in nation A.

For example, British and American leaders during the Suez and Skybolt crises failed to design optimum signals because they did not understand the nuances of each other's system. A rare counter-example is presented in a memorandum prepared by Richard Neustadt on how to sell the MLF to a new Labour British government.

11-2. A participant who desires to send a signal will have other interests which will influence what he proposes.

11-2 a. He will know that other audiences will hear his signal.

11-2 b. Reaction of other audiences will always be taken into account and may, given his interests, be of greater concern.

For example, Secretary of State John F. Dulles, in a private con-

versation to convey to British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan what the American position was on Suez, recognized that the British leader, out of concern or appreciation, might telephone his old friend President Eisenhower to report the conversation. This report, Dulles feared, could set back his efforts to establish a relationship of trust with the President.

11-2 c. Even a participant focused only on national security interests will be concerned about other audiences at home and abroad.

For example, during the 1958 Quemoy crisis Dulles wanted to make absolutely clear to the Chinese that we would defend Quemoy but was inhibited from doing so by his fear that domestic critics of U.S. policy and the Chinese Nationalists would hear such a warning. He feared that domestic opposition would use a warning of this sort to effectively challenge his policy. He was also concerned that the Nationalists would use the warning as a handle to provoke a clash between the U.S. and the Chinese Communists.

Prop. 12. The decision of a government in a game designed to influence the behavior of nation A will deviate from the proposal of any single participant as explained by Bureaucratic Politics Model . In part the differences among participants which affect the result will be directly related to influencing the behavior of the other government in that

1. Participants may differ on what actions by nation A are desirable.
2. Participants may differ on how to induce the desired behavior.

For example, at one point in the Suez crisis Dulles apparently proposed that the United States assure the British government that the U.S. would assume the financial cost of bypassing the Suez Canal if this became necessary. Neustadt suggests that Dulles had concluded (correctly, he argues) that this promise would reduce substantially the chance of the British resorting to force without any real probability of the U.S. having to make good on its commitment. He was unable to convince Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey, not because Humphrey did not want to stop the British, but because (Neustadt implies) Humphrey did not quite accept Dulles' complicated explanation of how the British cabinet functioned and because he did not want to yield his control of the funds involved.

Prop. 13. Actions which follow from a decision related to affecting the actions of nation A will deviate from the decisions as explained by Bureaucratic Politics Model . In part the deviation will be directly related to influencing the actions of nation A in that

1. Participants may differ on what actions by nation A are desirable.

For example, General Douglas MacArthur, learning that Truman was about to publicly announce American desire for an armistice in Korea, hoping to end the war on compromise terms, broadcast a surrender demand to the enemy because he opposed a compromise surrender.

2. Participants may differ on how to induce the desired behavior.

For example, former U.S. Ambassador to India Kenneth Galbraith reports in his Journal many reasons when his actions deviated from his

instructions because he believed his actions were more likely to bring about the desired Indian action.

3. Embassies and military field commanders frequently differ in this way.

Prop. 14. Nation A will now react according to Prop. ~~13~~²⁻¹³ to the actions resulting from this game and other actions of nation B as well (Prop. 1).

Prop. 15. The changes in behavior of either nation intended to change the actions of the other in a desired direction will rarely succeed.

Prop. 16. It will succeed^{only} (1) if the participant succeeds in changing the actions of his nation so as to send a clear, consistent, simple signal and (2) if some participants in the other nation want, in pursuit of their own interests, to change behavior in the desired way and (3) if this signal serves to increase the influence of these participants.

For example, the American effort to get the Japanese government to surrender without the necessity of invading Japan succeeded only because:

- (1) the United States sent Japan some of the clearest signals in history including dropping two atomic bombs, destroying Tokyo with fire bombing, destroying the Japanese fleet, and assembling an invasion force;
- (2) there was a strong group within the Japanese government, including the Emperor, his principal adviser, and the Foreign Minister who had opposed the war from the start and wanted to surrender; and (3) the American signals increased this group's sense of determination and willingness to run risks while discrediting and demoralizing their opponents. No major figure in Japanese ruling circles changed his mind about the desirability of war with the United States from the

beginning of the war to the end. Those who wanted to begin the war remained opposed to surrender.

Prop. 17. More often changes in actions by one nation will have minimal effect on the actions of another nation or will have unintended and unanticipated effects on stands and behavior.

Prop. 18. The process suggested by Prop. ~~2-12~~²⁻¹³ will continue until effects on actions end; before this occurs crisis, war, or mutual disengagement sometimes occur.

The utility of these propositions in explaining outcomes involving the actions of two nations are illustrated by brief discussions of two crises--Skybolt and Cuba--and one war--the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Section III:
POLICY IMPLICATIONS

We present here some illustrative policy implications of the bureaucratic politics model in the form of policy advice to players in the U.S.

government, in particular to senior players. The presentation takes the form of precepts without evidence of elaboration, but in some cases we present examples to illustrate a point, or to show that some people believe the contrary. These precepts are divided into two parts: (1) advice about the behavior of other governments and the effect of U.S. behavior on the behavior of other governments, and (2) advice about the behavior of the U.S. government.

BEHAVIOR OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS

Explanation of the Behavior of Other Governments

1. Be suspicious of explanations that depend on the assumption that one can reason back from detailed characteristics of specific behavior to central government intentions or doctrine. For example, that the Soviet SS-9 deployment means, as Secretary Laird has testified, that "they are going for a first-strike capability and there's no doubt about it." [Y.]
2. Recognize that in most cases the full range of behavior exhibited by a government was not intended by any single participant. In most cases, the policy and action decisions were compromises and actual behavior reflects programs, SOPs and interests of implementors, as well as the relevant decisions. For example, a Soviet analyst who neglected these factors would have come to erroneous conclusions about why the United States was deploying an ABM system from a study of then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's speech in October 1967 laying out the arguments against a large Soviet-oriented ABM system, while announcing a limited deployment of ABMs.

3. Press those charged with providing explanations for detailed explanations based on a Bureaucratic Politics Model.

4. Recognize that leaders of other governments may have quite different images of the world, information, etc., that lead them to see events in a dramatically different light. For example, Chinese bombardment of the offshore islands in 1954 may have reflected fear on the part of some Chinese leaders of American encirclement because of the security treaties the United States was signing -- an explanation not even considered by U.S. leaders because of our knowledge that the treaties were defensive. [Halperin, Siegal].

Prediction

1. Be suspicious of predictions based primarily on calculations about the national security interests and doctrines of another nation. Whereas calculations of this sort may provide an appropriate surrogate in the case of some problems, for example, deterrence of nuclear war by a stable balance of terror, in most cases such predictions will not be satisfactory. For example, estimates of Soviet force postures have frequently gone astray for this reason.

2. Ask for a bureaucratic-political map of the factors that can affect an outcome, including in particular, a list of the participants and their interests.

3. Andy Marshall has provided a set of specific propositions related to predicting Soviet force posture:

~~the~~ a nation
(1) Force posture for ~~the~~ is especially influenced by the organiza-

tional interests and behavior of sub-parts of the military establishment.

(2) Internal Soviet security controls over flow of information, and the general privacy of the decisionmaking process, leads to an even more bureaucratically influenced force posture than is usual in western countries.

(3) Parts of the Soviet military bureaucracy strive to keep their budgetary shares and are fairly successful in doing so. (4) The mechanics of the operation of the budgetary process have a substantial impact on the formation of force posture. (5) A series of specific propositions as to the behavior of the Soviet military bureaucracy designed to contrast with U.S. practices, budget splits, etc.

The strategic air defense bureaucracy is very strong and successful keeping its share of the budget. Programs within this area do not fit together especially well and demonstrate considerable willingness to spend large sums to technologically inferior systems.

Medium range offensive forces had shown strong bureaucratic position. Intercontinental or long-range offensive forces emerged slowly possibly due to small bureaucratic base until the development of the missiles. [42]

Planning

1. Ask whom in another government wants to do what you want for his own reasons. If you locate him, strengthen him. If you do not, despair.

2. Limit claims on other governments to outcomes reachable by them within a wide range of internal politics, under a variety of personalities and circumstances.

PLANNING WITHIN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

General Planning Precepts

1. Focus on changing governmental/organizational/individual behavior.
2. Decide whether or not it is necessary (or desirable) in order to change behavior to change policy.
3. Be aware that if it does appear necessary (desirable) to change policy in order to change behavior, the change in policy in the great majority of cases is only a way station to the desired outcome and not the outcome itself -- often only an early way station.
4. Realize that others, who may desire different outcomes, may also be planning, and take their planning into account.
5. Be prepared to modify your choice of outcome, or your declared prediction of the consequences of that outcome, in order to induce others to cooperate, taking into account, however, that these modifications may-(or-
~~game~~
may-not) affect the nature of your ^{game} with third parties.
6. Be aware that such modifications (compromises) may give rise to outcomes, due to the reactions of others, at home or abroad, which are less desirable than the existing state of affairs, and that if the probability of such outcomes is sufficiently high, the game should not be started, or, once started, ended. With this consideration in mind, review frequently ~~at least twice a day~~ the state of play.
7. In choosing the desired outcome, consider how many changes in individual or organizational behavior are required for its achievement.
8. Assess whether desired changes in behavior will be easily observed or monitored. Design outcomes so as to produce natural monitors

(but don't count on ~~them~~). -

9. Try to design outcomes so as not to affect major organizational interests, particularly the autonomy of the organization to pursue what is seen to be the essence of its function, promotions, roles and missions, and budgets.

10. Design proposals so that people can agree for different reasons.
(Use arguments that appeal to one and offend others only in private.)

11. Plan systematically. Either internalize or consult an explicit planning guide. See Appendix.

Interests

1. Recognize multiple interest and faces (where they stand depends on where they sit)

2. Recognize that stands on issues are determined by calculations of multiple interests of which national security interests are only one. Therefore, only in cases where national security arguments are clearly dominant are they likely to change a player's stance on a particular issue.

3. Recognize that where a participant is strongly motivated by organizational interests, he will resist outcomes that seem to threaten the autonomy of his organization to pursue what is conceived to be the essence of its activity. For example, foreign service officers have consistently opposed proposals to give the State Department operational control of foreign operations beyond representation, negotiation, and reporting, e.g., foreign aid, military assistance programs, and foreign information service.

4. Recognize that players with strong organizational interests will also be importantly affected by the impact of an outcome on promotion patterns, roles and missions, and budgets.

5. These interests, particularly the interest in roles and missions, will affect their behavior in situations that are regarded by the senior players as major national crises in which we are obviously all pulling together. For example, the competition between the CIA and Air Force over U-2s in the Cuban Missile Crisis, competition between the Air Force and Navy in reporting on the effectiveness of the bombing in North Vietnam. [47]

Information

1. Assume that others will give you information that they think will lead you to do what they want rather than the information that you would prefer to have. (For example, according to a DIA analyst:

[From 1964-65, when U.S. involvement in Vietnam began to be considerable, until late 1966 or early 1967, the generals in Saigon worked to build up U.S. troop strength. Therefore, they wanted every bit of evidence brought to the fore that could show that infiltration was increasing. DIA obliged and also emphasized in all reports the enemy's capability to recruit forces from the South Vietnamese population. In 1967 a second period began. The high priests of Saigon decided that we were "winning." Then the paramount interest became to show the enemy's reduced capability to recruit and a slowdown in infiltration due to our bombing. The tone and emphasis of reports from the field changed radically, and so did those put out by DIA.]

It should not be concluded that anyone suppressed evidence. No one did. The military in Saigon sent all the facts back to Washington eventually. During the buildup period, infiltration data and recruitment data came in via General Westmoreland's daily cablegram. Data from field contact with enemy units came amid the more mundane cables or by courier up to five weeks later. Cables from Westmoreland, of course, were given higher priority in Washington. When we started "winning," detailed reports highlighting "body counts" and statistics on how many villages were pacified were cabled with Westmoreland's signature; recruitment studies were pouched or cabled with the reports on the fluctuating price of rice. It was all a matter of emphasis.]

3. Do not assume that there are not critical differences in these evaluations of information simply because of a piece of paper that reports the unanimous conclusions of the group. For example, DIA differences with General Westmoreland's evaluation of the Tet offensive as total defeat for the [46] enemy were not reported.

4. Recognize that technical evaluations and conclusions are frequently based on simple rules of thumb rather than complex technical calculations. The rules of thumb are often wrong. For example, the optimum characteristics for the first generation of American missiles as specified by the von Neumann committee as one megaton, 5500 miles, and CEP of 5 miles, were based respectively on a round number, a quarter of the earth's circumference, and compromise [7] between those who were optimistic and those who were pessimistic about accuracy.

5. Don't assume that information that you pass on to other players is passed on by them to their subordinates or superiors.

Options

1. Recognize that the options presented will be based on the programs and SOPs of the organizations that generate the options.
2. Recognize that options which require cooperation between two independent organizations are unlikely to be advanced by either of these organizations.
3. Recognize that organizations tend to assert that an option is feasible only if it permits the organization considerable freedom of action, and that options designed by organizations will be designed to maximize their freedom of action. For example, in 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff were prepared to recommend the introduction of American troops into Laos only if the President [18] issued them an assurance that nuclear weapons would be used if necessary.
4. Recognize that options tend to be biased by simplistic and unstated hunches about domestic politics and bureaucratic politics.
5. Recognize that options will be designed on the basis of assumptions that the other government acts as a single individual motivated primarily by national security interests. In some cases this assumption will be complicated by some feel for Foreign Office ~~formalistic~~ ^{and domestic} politics.
6. Don't assume that participants are in fact motivated by the arguments they put forward in favor of their stand.
7. Recognize that the intensity of a participant's argument for a position may not reflect the intensity of his commitment to that stand.

Implementation

1. Recognize that people do not feel obliged to implement faithfully a chosen action.
2. Note that they have available a number of alternatives, including implementing the letter and not the spirit, delay, outright disobedience, as

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well as over-zealous implementation.

3. Examine with great care the instructions given by an organization to its members for the implementation of some decision.

4. Locate yourself, prospective helpers, and presumed opponents, in relation to all action channels readily or possibly available for implementing the results you want, and blocking those you fear.

5. Recognize that in the short run, the behavior implemented will reflect existing organizational programs and SOPs.

6. Recognize that if an organization is forced to change its behavior it will tend to change to another program or SOP in its repertoire, rather than devising a new and perhaps more appropriate SOP.

7. Ernest May has suggested a basic precept and some elaboration regarding the behavior of foreign missions: Changing personnel is more likely to lead to changing behavior than changing orders to existing personnel: One new ambassador (of the right persuasion) is worth a thousand cables.

8. Recognize that members of foreign missions will employ various devices to increase their independence of home authority:

(a) They will often attempt to present their governments with fait accompli.

(b) They will exploit visits by high officials of their governments by getting these officials on record as supporting mission positions. They will then use the record as evidence of a national commitment.

(c) They will reinterpret or evade unwelcome directives from home, hoping that the issuing authority will be forgetful or inattentive. (Ordinarily, their hopes will be fulfilled.)

(d) If authorities at home insist on compliance with unwelcome directives, the mission will warn of "dire consequences," etc. [49]

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APPENDIX

Planning Guide

I. What precisely do I want to accomplish

- A. First attempt to predict what will occur
- B. Plan and implement only if
 - 1. Disaster appears likely (possible)
 - 2. Substantial improvement is likely
- C. Identify precisely the outcome I seek
- D. Why do I seek it
 - 1. Good in itself given my values (if so do I wish to reconsider my values)
 - 2. I believe it will lead to a further outcome which I value. (If so can I state the causal chain so I can retest.)
 - 3. I believe it will lead to behavior by other governments. (If so consider that the other government is not a unitary actor and that its bureaucracy will do only what is in their interest in their own terms; influence is most likely to take the form of altering incentives and power. Consider also how reliable my information is on the other government.)
- E. How likely am I to get the outcome as I desire it.
 - 1. Withhold judgment until working out paths to action and strategy.
 - 2. Consider relevant Programs and SOPs.
 - 3. Consider internal and external biases.
- F. How important is this outcome to me compared to others

II. Alternative Paths to Action

- A. Map out alternative routes to the desired outcome
- B. Recognize that a change in policy may be neither necessary or sufficient.
- C. Seek to change policy only if
 - 1. Necessary to remove an absolute behavior (e.g., Boycott Cuba)
 - 2. Useful as a hunting license
 - 3. Necessary given my access to those who must perform the action
 - 4. Likely to lead easily to a change in action
- D. Consider how high I need to go. (Do not involve the President unless necessary or he is likely to be sympathetic, i.e., he has a problem this may solve.)
- E. If seeking a change in policy plot the action path from there to changes in actions.
- F. Consider for each path who will have the action. (Is there any path in which I will have the action?)
- G. Specify the formal actions which are necessary
- H. What resources do I have to move action along each path with success (re-judge after considering tactics.) Relative advantages of each path.
- I. How will resources expanded to get to one way station outcome affect ability to get to further stations.
- J. What additional information will help? Can I get it? At what cost?

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III. Framing tactics-maneuvers and arguments --- to move along a path

- A. Identification of the participants and their interests (including those beyond the executive branch)
 - 1. Who will inevitably be involved according to the rules of the game?
 - 2. Who might seek to play but could be excluded?
 - 3. Who might not seek to play but could be brought in?
 - 4. What are the likely interests of the various participants, in what ~~face of~~ currency will they see the issue, how will they define the stakes? Consider organization, personal, political and national interests.
 - 5. Who are natural allies, unappeasable opponents, neutrals who might be converted to support, opponents who might be converted to neutrality.
- B. How can I lead a participant to see that the outcome I desire is in his interest as he sees it.
- C. How can I change the situation to have an outcome conflict less (not at all) with participants interests as he sees them.
- D. Do I have the resources for this purpose? If not can I get others to use theirs?
- E. What specific manuevers should I use at what stages
- F. What arguments should I use
 - 1. In general
 - 2. On a discriminatory basis
- G. If I must get a large government to change its behavior
(Add from report of organization group)
- H. Should I try to bring in players outside the executive branch? If so, how?
- I. How can I tell how well I am doing.

IV. Gauging costs and benefits

- A. Reconsider from time to time all phases. Specifically:
 - 1. How high up should one seek a decision?
 - 2. How should the decision sought relate to the change desired, i.e., should it be a decision to change policy, to change patterns of action, or to take a single particular new step (or to stop an on-going action)?
 - 3. By what means will the initial decision which is sought be converted into the desired action?
- B. Plan of action.
 - 1. How to move the action to the way station and final outcome desired.
 - 2. What maneuvers and arguments to use on or with the other participants.
 - 3. At time sequence.
- C. To what extent is this process consciously duplicated by participants seeking a change? Are some participants more likely to plan than others? To plan effectively?
- D. How is the choice of way station outcomes and route action made?